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Abstract 
In this chapter, we draw on a comparative international survey of management 
strategies and employment practices in U.S. and Indian customer contact call centers.  We 
compare these practices across three types of centers: U.S. in-house, U.S. outsourced, and 
Indian outsourced- offshore operations.  We consider two questions. First, how similar or 
different are call center management strategies and employment systems in each type of 
establishment? Second, what are the implications of variation in management practices for 
outcomes such as turnover, which is a major problem for service quality and productivity in the 
industry.  We find that U.S in-house centers tend to adopt a more professional approach to 
service management, while U.S. outsourced centers adopt the most cost-driven approaches.  
Indian offshore operations represent a contradictory pattern of management practices, with the 
use of a highly educated workforce, but with highly standardized work processes that lead to 
under-utilization of human capital.  Both U.S. and Indian subcontractors experience high 
turnover rates, compared to U.S. in-house locations, and these are explained by the high levels 
of scripting and standardized processes found in these worksites.   We conclude with a 
discussion of policy implications. 
 
 
 
Paper prepared for the Brookings Institution Conference, Offshoring White-Collar Work – The 
Issues and Implications, Washington, D.C.: Bookings Institution.  May, 2005. 
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Service Management and Employment Systems 
in U.S. and Indian Call Centers1 
 
 The explosive growth of call centers in India has gained widespread attention because of 
its potential impact on employment in the United States and other advanced economies.  Media 
accounts report that Indian operations are more likely to use college educated workers while 
paying one-tenth of U.S. wages.  Some argue that these advantages may allow Indian centers 
to outcompete U.S. centers on both cost and quality (Dossani & Kenney, 2004).  Nonetheless, 
complaints of poor quality and security, as well as consumer backlash have led some firms to 
pull out of India while leaders in the offshoring business like GE have sold their Indian 
operations all together.  High turnover rates have become a particularly serious problem in 
recent years as an expanding number of employers compete for a small pool of educated 
employees – a trend that both increases costs and undermines service quality.  
Our understanding of this emerging sector, however, is based largely on anecdotal 
evidence, with more heated debate than systematic empirical investigation.  Even national 
figures on employment, industry trends, and the percent of centers that are operated in-house 
(as opposed to outsourced or offshore) are unreliable2.  In addition, there has been little or no 
research on management and employment practices in this sector -- either in the U.S. or in 
India.  In this paper, therefore, we consider two questions.  First, how similar or different are call 
center management strategies and employment systems in each country?  Here, our goal is to 
map the management practices adopted across three types of operations: in-house centers in 
the U.S., outsourced centers in the U.S., and outsourced-offshore centers in India.  By 
outsourced-offshore, we mean establishments that are owned and operated by subcontractors 
in India and serve the U.S. market (we refer to these as ‘offshore’ throughout the paper).  Is 
there systematic variation in these practices or is there a call center ‘production model’ that has 
diffused across very different institutional and organizational contexts?  Second, what are the 
implications of variation in management practices for outcomes such as turnover?  In other 
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words, which practices explain the high levels of turnover in the industry?   
To answer these questions, we draw on an original establishment level survey of 330 
call centers in the U.S. and India.  We focus on customer contact rather than back office 
operations such as check processing or on-line order fulfillment.  For each center, the survey 
provides information on the customer base, market and ownership conditions, organizational 
characteristics, work functions, workforce skills and training, call center technology, work 
organization, compensation, and outcomes such as absenteeism and turnover.  In the next 
section, we discuss prior research that informs our study, and in section three we present the 
study methods and analytic strategy.  Section four discusses our findings, and the final section 
outlines the study’s limitations and implications for policy. 
Prior Research 
 A first question in this study concerns the extent to which call center management 
practices vary across different markets and institutional settings.  Call centers represent a new 
industrial model driven by advances in information technologies that are now ubiquitous.  Call 
center technologies facilitate the automation of services through interactive voice recognition 
units, standardize customer transactions through skill-based routing systems, create machine-
paced operations through automated call distribution systems, and routinize work through 
widespread use of scripting and electronic monitoring 
 However, research shows that service management strategies and employment systems 
vary substantially across centers serving different industries, customer segments, and work 
functions – from professional approaches to service to highly transactional or cost-driven ones 
(Frenkel, Tam, Korczynski, & Shire, 1998; Batt, 2000; Shire, Holtgrewe, & Kerst, 2002).  In this 
line of research, work and employment systems typically are defined to include three 
dimensions: a) the level of education and training required; b) the level of discretion and 
collaborative problem-solving embedded in the design of work; and c) the level and type of 
compensation system designed to motivate effort (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; 
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Batt, 2002). 
The professional service model includes a set of employment practices based on high 
relative skills and training, employee discretion and collaborative problem solving, and high 
relative pay (Batt, 2002; Heskett, Sasser, & Schlesinger, 1997).  This approach to service 
management is typically found in business-to-business centers and IT help desks or technical 
service centers.  By contrast, centers that focus on simple transactions, such as telemarketing, 
reservations, or credit card handling, require relatively low skills, and jobs are likely to be highly 
routinized with low pay.  Quality control is ensured through extensive use of electronic 
monitoring systems (Heskett et al., 1997). 
A more complex question is how to explain the variation in customer contact centers that 
fall between these two extremes: centers that target the mass market or a mixture of markets 
and that provide service and sales for products that entail some degree of complexity along with 
opportunities to bundle services and customize offerings.  These represent the overwhelming 
majority of contact centers, serving customers in such sectors as financial services, insurance, 
telecommunications, and a variety of manufacturing industries.  Here, management strategies  
vary considerably in how much weight they give to competing on quality and mass 
customization (Pine, 1993) versus focusing primarily on cost.  
In-house versus Outsourced Strategies 
How does this variation in call center management strategies and employment systems 
map on to their ownership status – that is, whether they remain as in-house operations, are 
outsourced, or sent offshore?  There are many reasons to believe that outsourced and offshore 
centers will adopt management strategies that focus more on controlling costs than investing in 
employees.  First, outsourcing allows firms to avoid paying the high wages associated with 
internal equity norms and internal labor markets (Abraham, 1990) or union contracts (Pfeffer & 
Baron, 1988).  Several studies have found that subcontractors hire workers at lower pay and 
benefits to do the same work (Davis-Blake & Uzzi, 1993).  Erickcek, Houseman and Kalleberg 
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(2003) found that this is particularly true for low-skilled work, where subcontracting led to the 
loss of union representation as well as lower pay and benefits.  
Second, the literature on transaction cost economics suggests that outsourced centers 
will focus on cost reduction because, as work is turned over to a third-party, the client firm must 
absorb the costs of monitoring and contract enforcement (Williamson, 1985).  Thus, client firms 
are likely to exert great pressure on subcontractors to keep costs low in order to justify the 
additional transaction costs of managing the vendor relationship.  In addition, client firms worry 
about the operational risks associated with third-party subcontracting; and as a result, are likely 
to outsource those processes that are easily standardized or codified and monitored through 
objective performance metrics.  As research by Ravi Aron in this volume (chapter XX) shows 
that the more work processes are codified and the higher the number of performance metrics 
agreed upon by the buyer and seller, the lower the operational risk.   Other research also 
demonstrates that subcontractors drive efficiency through greater work intensity and capital 
utilization, compared to in-house operations (Marsden, 1999).  In a recent study, Grugulis, 
Vincent, and Hebson (2003) examined outsourcing in three functions requiring radically different 
levels of skill and complexity, and found that in each case the process of subcontracting led to 
higher levels of employee monitoring, adherence to specific performance metrics, and lower 
levels of employee discretion.  
In the call center industry these issues are likely to be particularly salient because “arms 
length” contracting and attention to the bottom line are widespread, and contract enforcement 
typically is ensured through on-going monitoring and adherence to performance metrics (Kinnie 
& Parsons, 2004).  Performance management technologies such as electronic monitoring 
systems provide real-time measures of talk times, adherence to schedules and scripted texts, 
and sales productivity, allowing client companies to regularly monitor the employees of 
subcontractors.  Thus, subcontractors are under intense pressure to contain costs and meet 
these efficiency goals. 
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The work of Levy and Murnane (2002) on computers, skills, and the organization of work 
provides additional insights into the process of subcontracting.  They have argued persuasively 
that computers are best able to automate jobs that require rules-based logic -- such as data 
management and order processing – precisely the kind of jobs frequently found in call centers.  
Automation does not eliminate all jobs, but creates standardized work processes that reduce 
operational risk and allow electronic monitoring of a wide range of performance metrics.  Once 
these processes are computerized and standardized, they are more easily outsourced to third 
party vendors.  However, more complex processes with higher levels of uncertainty are more 
likely to be retained in-house, where companies have direct control over operations that require 
more tacit knowledge and entail more nuanced interactions with customers. 
The strategic management literature on core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; 
Quinn, 1992) provides another perspective on how and why outsourced work systems are likely 
to be more cost focused and standardized than those managed in-house.  In theory, firms 
should retain functions that they consider to be their core competency while outsourcing those 
functions that are non-core.  Core capabilities are defined as those that contribute value to 
customer benefits and end products, that provide access to a wide variety of markets, and that 
are difficult for competitors to imitate (Prahalad et al., 1990).  When applied to the choice of 
employment systems, the theory suggests that firms should retain human capital that creates 
value for the firm and is rare or unique and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991; Williamson, 1981).  
For example, firms are likely to choose internal employment systems for operations that involve 
firm specific knowledge and skills, team-based systems, or work processes that involve “social 
complexity”, “causal ambiguity”, or “idiosyncratic learning” (Lepak & Snell, 1999: 35).  They are 
likely to externalize or subcontract work that is more generic, involves lower order skills, or is 
transactional in nature.  Much call center work appears to fall into this latter category, and thus 
would be viewed as a prime candidate for outsourcing. 
According to this argument, whether call center work is outsourced or not depends on 
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whether customer relationship management is considered a core competency or central to a 
firm’s competitiveness.  If the products and services offered by a company are relatively 
complex, involving firm-specific knowledge of products, processes, or customers, then firms are 
likely to retain their customer service and sales functions in-house.  Similarly, if companies seek 
to compete on quality service or customer loyalty, they are also likely to keep call center work 
in-house because they do not want to lose control of their customer base or have their 
customers treated generically – in the same fashion as the customers of their competitors – who 
may be using the same call center subcontractor.   
For high value added customers, such as business customers, firms are particularly 
likely to use a strategy of service quality, customization, and loyalty (Batt, 2000) and therefore 
retain business-to-business channels in-house.  For mass market service channels, the costs 
and benefits of keeping operations in-house or not is a more ambiguous question from a 
strategy perspective; and there appears to be considerable variation in what companies actually 
do.  While call center subcontractors grew dramatically in the 1990s in the U.S. (2001; 
Datamonitor, 2003), at least eighty-five percent of contact centers in this country continue to be 
in-house operations (Batt, Doellgast, & Kwon, 2004; Datamonitor, 2001).  This would suggest 
that a large majority of firms view their customer service and sales operations as central to their 
competitiveness -- or at least have not yet become convinced that they should outsource them. 
The implications of these arguments for the design of work and employment systems are 
quite straight forward.  Companies are more likely to retain in-house services that are more 
complex, that involve customer transactions that are more nuanced or uncertain, and that 
provide services to higher-valued customers.  In order to meet the demands of these types of 
products and customers, they are more likely to use a strategy of service quality and 
customization, and therefore, to adopt a more professional approach to service compared to 
subcontractors.  Centers that are operated by subcontractors, either in the U.S. or offshore, by 
contrast, are more likely to compete on costs through lower wages and benefits, more 
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standardized work processes, and higher levels of performance monitoring. 
Outsourced versus Outsourced-Offshore Strategies 
The academic literature provides much less guidance for predicting the differences 
between U.S. outsourced and offshore centers in India. On the one hand, arguments regarding 
the likelihood of a more cost-based strategy in outsourced operations may be equally or more 
relevant to offshore subcontractors.  U.S. companies have sent work overseas to take 
advantage of lower wages, but at the same time, they are concerned about the level of service 
quality provided.  They also worry about consumer backlash and the security and privacy of 
financial databases.  A recent survey of U.S. executives reported that the top driver for moving 
operations offshore was cost savings, while the top reasons for staying onshore were security 
and service quality issues (Ventoro, 2005). 
For these reasons, U.S. companies may impose tighter constraints on managerial 
discretion in Indian centers and higher levels of performance monitoring and adherence to call 
center metrics.  If so, then we would expect the work and employment systems in Indian call 
centers to be more tightly constrained and standardized than those found among U.S. 
subcontractors. 
 On the other hand, unique conditions in the Indian labor market suggest that both the 
reasons for moving work to this segment and the incentives for investing in employees may 
differ from those in the U.S. outsourced sector.  First, the offshore workforce tends to be drawn 
from a relatively small pool of college educated, middle class Indians.  We might expect these 
employees to be more self-motivated, allowing managers to rely on more professional, or at 
least quasi-professional, employment practices to motivate their workforce.   Moreover, given 
the large cost advantages that Indian centers enjoy, there is opportunity to relax adherence to 
performance metrics such as talk time so that employees can use their skills and discretion to 
respond more effectively to customer requests.    
 In addition, the growing competition for these employees has put pressure on employers 
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to invest in a number of benefits intended to promote commitment and reduce turnover.  Many 
call centers serving the international market occupy sprawling complexes outfitted with gyms 
and canteens.  They often provide employees with free lunches and door-to-door taxi services 
and seek to create a “fun” environment with games and prizes.  The additional investment in 
“accent neutralization” training required by many companies, which averages one to two weeks, 
makes it particularly costly to lose employees.  Moreover, the use of fixed employment contracts 
in India also means that there is a long wait for new employees, which increases the expense of 
recruitment.  One manager of a multinational third-party center explained:  
You have to think about hiring way, way ahead because not only do you have to give 
30 days notice, they have to give their previous employer 30 days notice before they 
leave you or leave someone else and come to you.  Let’s say I was trying to hire 
someone from another company in India, she has to give 30 days notice, so I have a 
delay for the 30 days.  And once I get her, she has to do the normal products 
training, but she also goes through two and a half to three weeks of accent 
neutralization training.  So there is a long, long wait for employees offshore.  It’s a 
month longer than in the U.S., easy. (March 2005). 
 
 In sum, the unique labor market conditions and cost advantages of Indian offshore 
centers suggest that they will adopt a less transactional approach to work and employment 
systems than subcontractors located in the U.S. 
Management Practices and Turnover  
 The second question in this paper is how the different management strategies adopted 
across segments of the market translate into organizational outcomes.  Empirical research on 
the performance effects of alternative approaches to service management has expanded in 
recent years.  There is growing evidence that a more professional, or at least quasi-
professional, approach is associated with higher employee satisfaction and customer 
satisfaction (Loveman, 1998), higher sales productivity (Batt, 1999), lower turnover and higher 
sales growth (Batt, 2002), and higher service quality and higher net revenues (Batt & Moynihan, 
2004).   
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Low-cost systems, by contrast, typically are associated with high levels of employee 
dissatisfaction, absenteeism, and turnover; and these, in turn, often produce added costs and 
low service quality.  For example, several studies of call center workers have found that 
routinized work design and high levels of electronic monitoring lead to stress, anxiety, 
depression, emotional exhaustion, and burnout (Carayon, 1993; Deery, Iverson, & Walsh, 2002; 
Holman, 2001; Holman, Chissick, & Totterdell, 2002; Singh, 2000). Deery et al. (2002) found 
that customer interactions, scripts, routinization, workloads, and managerial emphasis on 
quantity predicted emotional exhaustion, which in turn predicted absenteeism.   Singh (2000) 
demonstrated that as worker burnout with customers increased, call center workers were able to 
maintain their productivity levels, but their self-reported quality was lower.  
 In this paper, we focus on turnover because it is extremely high in the industry and 
viewed as a major problem by employers.  Industry analysts estimate that it averages between 
30 and 70 percent in the U.S., but in our interviews, some managers reported rates of 100 to 
150 percent annually.  In India, news reports suggest that turnover rates are often 50 percent or 
higher.  Voluntary turnover, or the employee quit rate, is of particular interest to organizational 
researchers as it represents a large cost to employers.  When employees leave, their 
experience and the firm’s investments in training are lost.   Moreover, as noted above, the 
factors that influence turnover also influence other important outcomes, including employee 
motivation, service quality, and labor costs.    
Empirical studies of voluntary turnover have found that it is significantly related to human 
resource practices (Arthur, 1994, Huselid 1995), particularly with respect to work design and 
compensation.   In recent research, Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, & Gupta (1998) found that quit rates 
were lower when monitoring and work intensity were lower and pay and benefit levels were 
higher.  Similarly, Batt, Colvin, and Keefe (2002) found that greater discretion and collaboration 
at work coupled with high relative pay predicted lower quit rates while high levels of electronic 
monitoring and use of commission-based pay led to higher quit rates. 
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Expected Findings 
 We have argued above that ownership status is likely to be associated with alternative 
approaches to work and employment practices.  Based on the theoretical and empirical 
literature, we expect that in-house, outsourced, and offshore establishments will differ 
systematically in their service management and employment systems.  Compared to outsourced 
or offshore centers, in-house establishments are likely to adopt employment practices that 
involve a higher educated and better trained workforce, that provide employees with more 
discretion and problem-solving capability, and that offer higher relative pay.  We also expect 
differences between outsourced and offshore centers, with the latter likely to adopt a more 
professional approach to employment management than the former.  These differences in 
choice of employment system, in turn, should explain variation in turnover rates, with the more 
professional approach associated with significantly lower turnover.  In other words, work and 
employment practices should partially explain the relationship between ownership status and 
turnover.  To examine these arguments, we developed a model of turnover that includes 
controls for market and organizational characteristics, while examining the independent 
variables of ownership status and employment system characteristics, as follows: 
Turnover = f(market and organizational characteristics, ownership status, education and 
training, work organization, compensation strategy) 
Methods 
 Sample 
 The sample for this study is based on two identical establishment-level surveys 
conducted in the U.S. and India between mid-2003 and mid-2004.  The U.S. survey was 
administered to 472 call centers based on a stratified random sample drawn from the subscriber 
lists of Call Center Magazine (60 percent of the sample) and the Dun and Bradstreet listing of 
establishments in the telecommunications industry (40 percent of the sample).  This was 
necessary to identify call centers in different industries. A survey team conducted the survey by 
telephone with 40 minute average interview, yielding a 65.4 percent response rate. 
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 The Indian survey was administered to 60 call centers, based on a non-random sample 
of Indian call centers provided by the National Association of Software and Service Companies 
(NASCOM) in India.  Surveys were conducted on site in six regions with large concentrations of 
call centers (Chennai, Kolkata, Bangalore, Bombay, Hyderabad, and Delhi) with an average 
interview time 95 minutes.  Respondents in both surveys were asked to answer questions as 
they pertain to the “core” workforce in their establishment – the largest group of customer 
contact employees who carry out the primary work activity at that location.   
 Due to variation across the samples, we use a portion of the full dataset in this analysis.  
First, we restrict our sample to three market segments: large business, mass market, and all 
markets.  We dropped 106 small business centers and 10 operator services centers from the 
U.S. sample, as these segments were not present in the Indian sample.  Second, we excluded 
16 call centers that serve only the Indian domestic market (located primarily in Kolkata), as it is 
only the international centers that serve the U.S. market.  This resulted in a sample size of 392.  
Due to randomly-missing observations in the dataset, our regression analyses are based on a 
sample of 310 call centers (237 U.S. in-house, 42 U.S. outsourced, and 31 Indian offshore).  . 
 In both the U.S. and India, we conducted extensive site visits in different industry 
segments to aid with the design of the survey and interpretation of results.  In the U.S., we 
visited 12 in-house call centers and six outsourced call centers, where we interviewed 
managers, supervisors, and employees on various aspects of their human resource policies and 
work design strategies.  In India, each survey was administered on site, allowing the researcher 
to cross-check responses and providing an additional test of the reliability of survey responses. 
Measures 
 The independent variables of interest include the ownership status of the center (in-
house, outsourced, or offshore), and the work and employment system, as defined along three 
dimensions: human capital (employee education and training), work design (opportunities for 
discretion and problem-solving), and rewards (compensation practices).  To determine whether 
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an establishment was in-house or outsourced in the U.S. sample, respondents were asked how 
they would best describe the call center: as an in-house center providing services to their 
company or as a subcontractor providing services to other companies.  The offshore segment 
includes Indian call centers that serve an international market. Almost all of the Indian centers 
were owned and operated by Indian subcontractors, with only a handful owned by U.S. 
subsidiaries or U.S. subcontractors.  
To measure human capital, we control for the sex composition of the workforce and use 
two measures of education and training: the years of formal education of the typical worker in 
the call center and employer investment in initial training (an additive index of the number of 
weeks of initial training an employee receives and the number of weeks to become qualified).  
For work design, three measures capture the extent to which employees have opportunities for 
discretion and problem solving.  First, discretion over customer interactions is measured by the 
variable script use, based on a 1-5 Likert response to the question “to what extent are core 
employees required to use scripts when talking to a customer?” where 1 is “not at all” and 5 is “a 
great deal.”  Second, we used three measures to construct a work discretion index, again based 
on 1-5 Likert-type questions.  Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which core 
employees had discretion over their daily work tasks; tools, methods or procedures; and pace of 
work.  The three measures were highly correlated (p<.001) and were combined into a mean 
index.  The third measure of discretion, percent in offline teams, is the percentage of employees 
who participate with supervisors in problem solving groups or teams. 
The final group of variables measure compensation practices, including total 
compensation and percent commission pay.  We were unable to use average annual salary in 
the analysis due to the large difference in pay across the U.S. and India.  While there are 
national statistics in the U.S. on average compensation for customer service and sales 
employees, it is difficult to find accurate information on the typical pay of a call center employee 
in India.  We therefore constructed a pay ratio measure based on the ratio of a call center’s 
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average gross annual pay to the median pay in each full country sample ($29,000 in the U.S. 
and $2,444 in India).  Informal documentation from industry publications gave similar estimates 
for average pay levels in the Indian market.  The U.S. median pay in our sample was also 
similar to estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the median pay of customer service 
representatives ($28,720).  Percent commission pay is measured as the percentage of total 
annual pay that is based on individual commission. 
 Dependent variable. The dependent variable of interest is the average annual quit rate, 
as reported by managers for the previous calendar year.  A square root transformation was 
used to correct for the non-normal distribution of the variable. 
 Control variables. We included additional controls for common turnover determinants.  
The primary customer segment served by employees has been found in several previous 
studies of front-line service workplaces to influence both management practices and turnover 
rates (Batt, 2000, 2002; Keltner, 1998).  Call centers serving higher value-added segments, 
such as large business customers, can be expected to invest more both in the skills of the 
workforce and in employee retention, as well as to be more selective in hiring, reducing quit 
rates.  Call centers serving multiple market segments typically have a broader skill base and 
greater diversity in the job requirements. We thus control for whether the establishment serves 
primarily large business, mass market, or multiple market segments.  We also control for union 
presence, which has been found in past studies to be negatively correlated with quit rates (Batt 
et al., 2002; Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998).  Employees in unionized establishments 
are able to exercise “voice” versus “exit”, improving pay and working conditions, and reducing 
turnover (Freeman & Medoff, 1984). 
In earlier analyses, we tested the effects of several other control variables that have 
been used in past studies of turnover, including use of systematic selection procedures for 
hiring new employees, the ratio of applicants hired, whether the call center was part of a larger 
organization, and the age of the call center.  We also analyzed variation in outcomes when 
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controls for industry and type of call center work were added, including a control for whether the 
call center predominantly handled sales versus customer service.  None of these had a 
substantial effect on the coefficients of the independent variables of interest and either reduced 
or had a negligible effect on the overall Chi-square.  Several of these additional controls were 
also highly correlated with other variables included in the model.  For example, both the 
outsourced and offshore centers have significantly lower average age than in-house call 
centers.  Thus, in the final model we included a more parsimonious list of control variables that 
captured key measures of markets and organizational characteristics. 
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Results 
Table 1:  
Mean Comparison: In-house, Outsourced, and Offshore Call Centers 
 
    ANOVA 
 
In-
house   Outsourced Offshore p < .05 
Organizational characteristics     
   Establishment age in years 15.7 9.4 3.4 a,b,c 
   Part of a larger organization 79.6 75.9 78.9  
   % sales-oriented call centers 5.0 13.8 29.4 b 
   Call handle time in minutes 4.7 5.9        12.0  b,c 
Workforce characteristics     
   % female  68.9 71.5 43.1 b,c 
   % tenure less than 1 year 28.1 36.8 61.8 a,b,c 
   % part time 17.6 35.6 1.0 a,b,c 
Training and qualification     
   Average years education 13.3 12.6 14.0 a,b,c 
   % with typical education high school 38.3 69.0 36.4 a,c 
   Days of initial training 19.7 11.5 23.6 a,c 
   Days to become qualified  66.8 44.2 53.3  
   Days of ongoing training per year  9.6 10.4 11.2  
Employee discretion     
   Reliance on scripted texts* 9.9 48.3 32.4 a,b 
   Discretion over work* 9.9 3.4 5.9  
   Discretion over handling customer 
requests* 39.2 17.2 2.9 a,b,c 
   % participating in offline teams 36.2 22.2 6.9 b,c 
Performance Monitoring     
   % work time electronically monitored 49.5 67.7 91.7 a,b,c 
   Frequency of supervisor monitoring** 49.7 67.9 82.4 b  
   Frequency feedback and coaching** 46.0 55.2 94.1 b,c 
Compensation     
   Average annual pay ($)*** 27,713 23,881 2,635 a,b,c 
   % pay based on commission 8.4 4.1 18.5 b,c 
Turnover and Absenteeism     
   % quit 15.8 25.6 24.5 a,b 
   % total turnover (quits + dismissals) 24.6 41.2 29.6 a,c 
   % absenteeism    5.5 8.9 5.3 a,c 
Sample Size 181 29 34  
a  in-house and outsourced are significantly different;  
b  in-house and offshore are significantly different;  
c  outsourced and offshore are significantly different 
*     Percentage answering “a lot” or “a great deal” 
**   Percentage with weekly to daily performance monitoring 
*** Gross annual earnings    
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Comparison of Mean Characteristics 
 Table 1 presents a comparison of organizational characteristics, workforce 
characteristics, employment system variables, and organizational outcomes for the in-house, 
outsourced, and offshore centers.  We use a broader range of variables here than were 
included in our analysis of turnover antecedents to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
how organizational characteristics and management practices differ across the segments.  In 
addition, in order to make comparisons more precise, we restricted the mean comparison in 
Table 1 to non-union call centers serving mass market or multiple customer segments. 
We tested the significance of mean differences using one-way analysis of variance.  In 
general, there are significant differences in most dimensions of organizational characteristics 
and work and employment systems across the three types of centers. The patterns are 
consistent with our expectations, but there are important exceptions and contradictory patterns 
as well.  Overall, in-house centers tend to adopt a quasi-professional approach to employment 
compared to either outsourced or offshore centers.  They offer jobs with substantially more 
opportunities for discretion and problem solving, make significantly less use of electronic 
monitoring and performance management systems, offer higher pay and rely less on 
commission pay.  Associated with these patterns are significantly higher rates of organizational 
tenure and lower turnover rates than those found in either outsourced or offshore centers.   For 
example, while 28 percent of the workforce in U.S. in-house centers has less than 1 year of 
tenure, the comparable rates in outsourced centers are 37 percent, and in offshore centers, 62 
percent.  Annual employee quits alone are reported at 16 percent in in-house centers, but 26 
percent in outsourced, and 25 percent in offshore sites – that is, over 55 percent higher than the 
in-house centers. 
The exception to this pattern is that offshore centers rely on a workforce with somewhat 
higher formal education than those in in-house locations.  The typical worker in an Indian center 
has 14 years of education (on average 2 years of college) compared to 13.3 years among U.S. 
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in-house establishments.  Yet these differences are not as great as often portrayed in the 
media.  Close to 40 percent of managers in both types of centers (38 percent in-house and 36 
percent offshore) reported that the typical worker in their establishment is high school educated.  
Similar patterns hold for initial training, with offshore call centers providing 4.7 weeks on 
average, and in-house centers, 3.9 weeks.  However, given that much of the initial training in 
Indian centers is focused on accent neutralization, it appears that Indian centers do not provide 
more initial training for other aspects of the job. 
The differences between U.S. outsourced and Indian offshore centers are more 
contradictory.  The formal education levels of Indian centers are substantially higher than those 
found among U.S. subcontractors, where the typical worker has an average education of 12.6 
years and almost 70 percent of managers report that the typical worker has a high school 
diploma only.  Initial training in U.S. outsourced centers is less than half that found in Indian 
centers.  However, the amount of on-the-job training to become qualified and the annual rates of 
on-going training are not substantially different.  
However, despite relying on a more educated and full-time workforce, the Indian centers 
have work systems that are more tightly constrained and standardized than those found among 
U.S. subcontractors, contrary to our expectations.  With the exception of reliance on scripts, 
which is higher in the U.S. outsourced centers, Indian managers report substantially lower levels 
of discretion over handling customer requests and use of problem solving groups.  For example, 
only 3 percent of offshore call centers report giving employees “a lot” or “a great deal” of 
discretion in handling customer requests, compared to 17 percent of outsourced centers and 39 
percent of in-house centers.  While in-house centers have an average of 36 percent of 
employees participating in teams, 22 percent of employees in outsourced centers and only 7 
percent of those in offshore centers participate. 
Measures of performance monitoring illustrate a similar pattern.  Most call centers adopt 
a mix of practices to track employee performance on adherence to talk time, whether they follow 
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the scripts provided, and their effectiveness in both providing friendly service and resolving 
customer requests.  In a sales environment, monitoring is also used to both control potential 
employee fraud and provide coaching on selling techniques.  Both electronic monitoring and 
supervisor monitoring and feedback are employed for this purpose, and the intensity of these 
practices varies substantially across the different sites.  While about 50 percent of work time in 
in-house centers is electronically monitored, this average jumps to 68 percent in outsourced 
centers and 92 percent in offshore centers.  Similarly, supervisors provide feedback and 
coaching on a weekly or daily basis in 94 percent of the offshore centers, compared to much 
lower levels (46 and 55 percent) in the U.S. in-house and outsourced segments. 
With respect to compensation, the average median annual pay reported by managers is 
$27,713 among in-house centers, $23,881 in outsourced centers, and $2,635 in offshore 
centers. Thus, in-house centers pay about 14 percent more than do outsourced centers, and 90 
percent more than the offshore segment.  The use of commission pay is surprisingly low across 
the in-house and outsourced segments, at 8 and 4 percent, but significantly higher in offshore 
centers at 19 percent.  This probably reflects the higher percentage of sales oriented call 
centers in the offshore sample (29 percent), compared to the in-house (5 percent) and 
outsourced (14 percent) sites. 
Finally, we compare turnover and absenteeism – both important organizational 
outcomes.  High investments in training at many workplaces mean that turnover is costly, and 
the often tight scheduling practices based on predicted fluctuations in call volume mean that 
excessive absenteeism has an immediate negative effect on customer satisfaction and sales.  
As indicated above, quit rates as well as total turnover are the lowest among in-house centers 
and higher in outsourced and offshore centers. Absenteeism, by contrast, is highest in the 
outsourced segment (9 percent) and lower in both in-house and offshore centers (6 percent and 
5 percent respectively).  These measures capture the motivation of the workforce to show up 
and meet performance expectations, and are largely in line with our other results that indicate 
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outsourced centers tend to adopt a low-commitment employment system that combines low pay 
with intensive monitoring and low discretion. 
 Due to variation in the industries represented in each sample, we checked to see 
whether these patterns held when the sample was further broken down.  For example, we 
compared centers serving high end customers as well as those in telecommunications and 
financial services and found similar patterns.  That is, no particular sectors accounted for the 
variation found across in-house, outsourced, and offshore sites. 
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Table 2: Means, Standard Deviation, and Pairwise Correlationsa 
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Variable Means
 
 s.d.
 
1
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
10
 
11
 
12
 
13
 
14
 
15
 
1 Sqrt annual quit rate 3.23 2.22
2 Large business segment 0.34 0.47 -0.1
03 Multiple market segments 0.19 0.40 0. 2 -0.35
4 Mass market segment 
 
0.47 0.50 0.13 -0.67 -0.46
5 Union presence 0.08 0.27 -0.22 0.00 -0.05 0.04
6 Inhouse 0.76 0.42 -0.27 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.13
7 Outsourced 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.12 -0.12 -0.01 -0.08 -0.71
8 Offshore 0.10 0.30 0.24 -0.08 0.19 -0.08 -0.10 -0.60 -0.13
9 Percent female 0.64 0.25 0.08 -0.25 -0.04 0.27 0.24 0.11 0.12 -0.30
10 Years education 13.53 1.64 -0.19 0.21 0.01 -0.21 -0.06 0.07 -0.19 0.12 -0.46
11 Initial training investment 19.01 17.73 -0.23 0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.22 0.17 -0.15 -0.07 -0.04 0.06
12 Script use 2.19 1.20 0.27 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.43 0.26 0.31 0.07 -0.18 -0.17
13 Work discretion index 2.60 0.92 -0.37 0.15 0.07 -0.19 -0.01 0.23 -0.09 -0.22 -0.16 0.24 0.04 -0.29    
14 Percent in offline teams 0.36 0.38 -0.36 0.17 -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 0.27 -0.12 -0.25 -0.18 0.19 0.15 -0.16 0.25   
15 Pay ratio 1.19 0.60 -0.31 0.44 -0.11 -0.33 0.09 0.17 -0.16 -0.05 -0.46 0.50 0.30 -0.20 0.33 0.26  
16 Percent commission pay 0.11 0.20 0.04 0.11 -0.02 -0.09 -0.13 -0.05 -0.05 0.13 -0.29 0.08 0.08 -0.05 0.14 -0.04 0.39
 
 
a For all correlations greater than .11, p<.05 
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Table 3: Tobit Estimates for Quit Ratesa 
 
Variable  
              
               
              
            
              
           
              
        
              
              
              
       
              
              
              
        
             
             
           
          
         
         
         
           
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 Coeff
St. 
Error Coeff
St. 
Error Coeff
St. 
Error Coeff
St. 
Error 
Organizational & Market  
Characteristics 
   Large business segment -1.02 ***
 
0.31 -0.61 +
 
0.32 -0.32 0.30 -0.17 0.31 
   Multiple market segments -0.62 + 0.38 -0.50 0.37 -0.21 0.35 -0.20 0.34 
   Union presence -1.99 *** 0.54 -2.02 ***
 
0.55 -2.15 ***
 
0.51 -1.91 ***
 
0.52 
   Outsourced 1.22 *** 0.41 0.78 + 0.41 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.39 
   Offshore 2.03 *** 0.47
 
2.30 ***
 
0.48 0.57 0.50 0.40
 
0.50 
Human Capital     
   Workforce: % female 1.10 + 0.68 0.22 0.64 0.19 0.67 
   Years of education -0.20 * 0.09 -0.06 0.09 0.01 0.09 
   Initial training investment -0.02
 
* 0.01
 
-0.01 +
 
0.01 -0.01
 
+ 0.01 
Work Design     
   Script use 0.22 + 0.12 0.23 * 0.12 
   Work discretion index -0.73 *** 0.15 -0.73 *** 0.15 
   Percent in offline teams -1.84
 
*** 0.37 -1.74
 
*** 0.37 
Compensation Strategy      
   Pay ratio  -0.52 + 0.32 
   Percent commission pay  1.47 * 0.71 
     
Constant 2.27  5.47  6.28  5.70   
Sample size 310  310  310  310   
Chi square likelihood ratio 50.02  67.73  124.89  130.05   
Probability > Chi square 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   
Pseudo R2 0.04  0.05  0.09  0.10   
 
a Unstandardized Tobit estimates are reported 
 
+ = p<.10; * = p<.05; ** = p<.01; *** = p<.001
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Multivariate Analyses 
 Table 2 provides the means, standard deviations, and pairwise correlations of the 
variables included in the final model.  For our analyses of turnover, we estimate left-censored 
Tobit models because the dependent variable is truncated at zero (Maddala, 1992).   
Predictors of turnover. Table 3 reports estimates of models for quit rates at the 
establishments.  The first equation, model 1, includes the market segment and organizational, 
characteristics.  The second equation adds controls for employee human capital, while the third 
and fourth add measures of work organization and compensation practices.   
 In the first model, after controlling for market segment, outsourced and offshore centers 
have significantly higher quit rates (compared to the omitted variable, in-house centers), while 
unionized centers are associated with significantly lower quits.   
 In model 2, both the length of initial training investment and years of education are 
significantly associated with lower quit rates.  The percent of the workforce that is female is 
positively associated with higher quits, but this relationship becomes insignificant in the full 
model.  Offshore ownership status continues to be positive and significant at the p <.001 level, 
while the significance of outsourced status decreases but is still marginally significant.  With the 
introduction of work design variables in model 3, neither outsourced nor offshore status remains 
significant, and human capital variables decline in significance.  Work discretion and the use of 
problem-solving groups are significantly negatively associated with quit rates (p <.000), while 
script use is positively associated (p. <.10).  In the full model (4), union presence, training 
investments, work discretion, use of problem-solving groups, and the pay ratio are all 
significantly associated with lower quit rates, while script use and percent commission pay are 
associated with higher quits. 
 We estimated the effect sizes of the Tobit coefficients by decomposing them into 
estimates of changes in outcomes above the left censored limit and changes in the probability of 
observing an outcome above the left limit (McDonald & Moffitt, 1980).  This provides an 
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interpretation equivalent to OLS estimates.3  The Tobit coefficients in the model are 0.62 of the 
OLS coefficients.  Thus, when the work discretion index changes by one-standard-deviation, the 
effect on quit rates decreases by 0.5 percentage points (0.62 x -0.73); while a one-standard-
deviation increase in the percent of employees who participate in offline teams decreases the 
effect on quits by 1.1 percentage points (p<.001).  
Discussion, Limitations, and Policy Implications  
  In this study we examined the extent of variation in service management and 
employment strategies among in-house, outsourced, and offshore call centers that provide 
similar services to U.S. customers.  We found significant differences in the patterns of 
employment practices and related outcomes across these three settings, but not in ways that 
were entirely anticipated.  In this sample of establishments, in-house centers tended to adopt a 
relatively coherent quasi-professional approach to service interactions compared to outsourced 
and offshore sites, with in-house jobs characterized by higher levels of initial investments in 
training and pay, greater discretion, and more problem-solving opportunities.  Offshore centers, 
by contrast, had somewhat higher levels of formal education and initial training, significantly 
lower levels of employee discretion and problem-solving, and higher levels of electronic 
monitoring and performance management.  From a managerial perspective, U.S. outsourced 
centers seem to present the worst of both worlds: lower formal education and training levels 
than in-house or offshore centers, low levels of discretion and problem-solving that closely 
resemble offshore centers, and levels of pay much closer to those found among in-house 
operations than among Indian centers. 
 In further multivariate analyses, we found that outsourced and offshore centers had 
significantly higher quit rates after controlling for the market segment served, union presence, 
and measures of employee human capital.  Systematic differences in work design, however, 
explained most of the variation in quit rates so that the significance of ownership status 
disappeared when these practices were included in our equations.  That is, ownership status is 
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an important driver in the choice of management and employment practices, with outsourced 
and offshore centers more constrained to follow standardized operating procedures and 
performance monitoring.  It is these practices, in turn, that explain the higher quit rates in these 
centers.  
There are several limitations to this study.  One concerns the representativeness of our 
samples, which we discussed earlier.  Because larger organizations are over-represented in our 
samples, if anything the study overstates the level of workforce education, pay, and levels of 
employee participation in call centers.  We have no reason to believe that the bias is greater in 
one sample or the other, but there is really no way to test this deficiency in the data.  A second 
limitation is that these large scale surveys provide only single-sourced data, and external labor 
market data from India is not available to assess the relative value of call center pay in that 
country compared to relative pay levels in the U.S.   
 A third limitation is that we cannot determine whether differences in management and 
employment systems are due to differences in levels of complexity in work functions or 
differences in business strategies based on quality and cost.  Complexity and quality service 
strategies are highly correlated, such that companies tend to adopt quality strategies for higher 
value-added functions, which typically are more complex in nature.  In our analysis of average 
differences across ownership types, we used various methods to compare centers by industry 
and customer segment as well as work function.  In each of these analyses, we found 
systematic differences based on ownership type.  However, sample size restrictions prevent us 
from determining whether differences are due to business strategies, service complexity, or 
some combination of both. 
 In addition, the outcome measured in this study is limited.  On the one hand, turnover is 
a useful metric to analyze because the industry has unusually high levels of workforce churn, 
which is widely recognized to be problematic and costly.  There is also considerable empirical 
evidence to show that turnover is associated with lower service quality and productivity.  On the 
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other hand, future research needs to examine a much wider array of performance measures 
that directly capture operational quality and productivity if we are to understand the relative 
costs and benefits of alternative service management strategies.  
Despite these limitations, the findings are consistent with other research on 
subcontracting relations.  For example, subcontractors are more likely to have standardized 
processes and use more performance monitoring and metrics, a pattern that supports Ravi 
Aron’s argument in this volume that these practices are central to reducing operational risk.  
Aron’s finding that workforce training does not have a large effect on reducing operational risk is 
also consistent with our analysis.  Despite the fact that offshore centers in India hire workers 
with relatively high levels of education and offer considerable initial training, the high levels of 
process standardization do not let employees use their human capital in ways that can improve 
operational performance. This point is reiterated in the work of Vivek Agrawal (this volume) who 
demonstrates that the return to investment in technology in Indian call centers is far below that 
found in the U.S.  He notes that this ‘cookbook’ approach to management reduces the 
incentives to innovate or constrains the ability to move up the value chain. 
Our findings have several policy implications at the level of managerial strategy and 
broader public policy.  At the level of managerial policy, the evidence is clear that the extensive 
use of routinized work processes in call centers leads to high levels of turnover, which are 
associated with lower service quality and productivity.  Moreover, to the extent that call centers 
hire college-educated workers, the highly constrained and monitored work system creates an 
inefficient use of human capital -- a particularly bad fit between selection and recruitment 
policies on the one hand, and work design policies on the other.  The under-utilization of human 
capital represents a substantial loss for Indian subcontractors, as they are paying for skills that 
they are not using. 
Thus, to the extent that companies have complex service offerings or want to compete 
on the basis of service differentiation, quality, or customer loyalty, then they are likely to retain 
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customer contact interactions in-house, consistent with the transaction costs perspective and 
core competency argument.  To date, this appears to be what most U.S. corporations are doing: 
after two decades of rapid growth of U.S. call centers, most industry estimates are consistent 
with our own survey that less than 15 percent of U.S. call centers are run by third party 
subcontractors; and only a tiny fraction have moved offshore.   
However, for those transactions that are simple and codifiable, companies are likely to 
continue to expand their operations offshore.  Our data suggest that the strategy of outsourcing 
operations to U.S. subcontractors is likely to be a transitory one, as the modest reductions in 
labor costs (compared to subcontractors offshore) may be offset by the high costs of turnover 
and low levels of employee skill.  According to this scenario, the U.S. subcontracting sector, 
which grew dramatically in the 1990s, will be the hardest hit by Indian competition.  If these 
findings hold across a larger and more representative sample of establishments, then the shift in 
customer contact employment from the U.S. to India is likely to be considerable, but remain 
confined to stand alone work functions that are relatively simple or transactional.  Under this 
scenario, the problem for both U.S. and Indian subcontractors is that stand alone call centers 
appear to be failing (see Dossani, this volume). 
 An alternative scenario is that Indian call centers will gain the ability to compete more 
fully on the basis of quality and customer service as well as price.  In theory, this is possible.  
With an educated workforce and high relative pay for the Indian labor market, Indian centers 
could be poised to handle more complex and nuanced customer transactions and provide 
service that builds customer loyalty.  However, the current work systems are not in any way 
geared towards that alternative, but rather contain fundamental contradictions that are 
reminiscent of the problems of high turnover among overqualified workers in the monotonous 
jobs found in U.S. manufacturing industries in the 1960s and 1970s (HEW 1973).   Current 
analyses of the potential for high quality service in offshore centers give too much weight to the 
level of formal education among workers and too little weight to the organization of work and 
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technology, which shape the effective use of that human capital (Jaikumar, 1986).  However, 
case study evidence by Rafiq Dossani (this volume) shows that some call centers have been 
able to move up the value chain and expand their operations to include increasingly complex 
processes.  Whether these examples of best practice can expand to the majority of call centers 
in India remains to be seen.  The issue is whether the current approach to managing vendor 
relations – through tight control by client firms -- is considered so fundamental to limiting costs 
and operational risk that it will not be abandoned, or whether it is a temporary phenomenon that 
will give way over time to closer supplier relations built on trust.  In the former case, the Indian 
call center sector would continue to handle relatively simple, codifiable, low value-added 
transactions.  In the latter case, the offshore market could expand to cover a much larger 
portion of the U.S. customer contact business.  Even here, however, companies will need to 
learn much more about what kinds of tacit knowledge and contextual understandings are 
needed for which types of customer interactions.  In service settings where ‘bridging to sales’ is 
a major source of revenues, for example, tacit knowledge of cultural norms may still be an 
important source of competitive advantage, thereby favoring U.S. in-house or outsourced 
locations. 
 A third alternative could involve a combination of organizational forms, with companies 
using a number of in-house, outsourced, and offshore venues to manage similar types of 
customer interactions.  In our field research, we found a number of cases of this emerging 
strategy; and Ravi Aron in this volume demonstrates that this ‘extended’ model of organization 
may hold the most promise for quality and productivity in the long run.  This approach allows 
companies to create competition for cost and quality innovations among their own subsidiaries 
and vendors.  It also allows for organizational flexibility, so that client firms can adjust volumes 
and vendor contracts to seasonal demand.  Similarly, some U.S. multinational subcontractors 
are offering a variety of venues to client firms, including a combination of on-shore and off-shore 
call centers, with volumes able to fluctuate according to seasonal demand.  These strategies 
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may help U.S. subcontractors survive as client firms exert on-going pressure to reduce costs. 
These scenarios also depend on the role that public policy plays in human resource 
development.  In India, there is evidence that demand is outstripping the supply of skilled labor, 
at least in the short run, in call centers cities such as Bangalore and Chennai.  Thus, there is a 
need for the Indian government to invest in the skills and human resource infrastructure needed 
to respond to external demand. 
In the U.S., the question is whether subcontractors are able to improve the skill base of 
the workforce.  They may be able to do so in locations where they have access to certification 
programs and community college and associate degree programs in customer service 
management.  Because centers are often co-located in ‘call center cities’ – such as 
Jacksonville, Tucson, San Antonio, Omaha, or Phoenix, there may be opportunities to build a 
skilled labor pool with access to on-going education and opportunities for multi-employer job 
ladders that help stabilize employment.  Our survey results suggest that public support for the 
industry is available, with 49 percent of outsourced call centers reporting that they use public 
training resources and programs.  Nearly all of the managers we interviewed in the outsourced 
industry relied heavily on local universities, community colleges, and partnerships with welfare-
to-work and public sector organizations to recruit employees.  These resources offer the 
potential to improve the quality of the workforce.  However, we found that they are often used to 
substitute for internal investments in employee skills and discretion rather than to support a 
more professional or high commitment strategy.  Thus while these types of innovations could 
allow U.S. subcontractors to improve the quality of their workforce and employment practices, 
the limited evidence in our study suggests that public sector resources are being used to 
supplant, rather than complement, private investment in human resource systems.  If this 
represents the future among U.S. subcontractors, then they are unlikely to remain competitive in 
relation to their Indian counterparts. 
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Appendix 1 
Estimates of U.S. Call Center Workforce, 2004 
To estimate the number of call center jobs in the U.S., we used the May, 2004, Occupational 
Employment and Wage Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2005).  We chose “office 
and administrative support occupations” (NAICS 43-0000).  Within that category, we chose the 
sub-occupations that were most likely to be located in call centers, based on the BLS 
description of work tasks and our own knowledge of call center operations.   We also included 
telemarketers from sales occupations.  The following chart details the employment numbers, 
percent of sample, and mean wages for those sub-occupations. 
  
Employment 
numbers 
% of U.S. 
workforce 
Mean 
hourly 
wage 
Mean 
annual 
wage 
Switchboard, answering services 206,370 0.15% $10.81  $22,490
Telephone operators 38,500 0.03% $14.53  $30,220
Bill & account collectors 445,180 0.32% $13.95  $29,010
Credit authorizers & checkers 66,010 0.05% $15.15  $31,520
New accounts clerks 96,560 0.07% $13.55  $28,180
Order clerks 289,830 0.21% $12.85  $26,730
Reservation agents, travel clerks 
(excludes travel agents, hotel clerks) 159,910 0.11% $14.48  $30,120
Insurance claims & policy processing 
clerks 239,250 0.17% $14.70  $30,580
Customer service representatives 2,021,350 1.45% $14.01  $29,130
Telemarketers 410,360 0.29% $11.29  $23,490 
Total  CC workers 3,973,320 2.85% $13.53* $28,147*
 
* Weighted average, weighted by number employed by occupational group. 
Source: BLS, Occupational Employment Statistics, May, 2004 (www.bls.gov/oes) 
By this methodology, there were an estimated 3.97 million call center workers in the U.S. in 
2004, representing 2.85 percent of the working population.  This estimate, however, 
undercounts some workers while overcounting others.  Overcounting may occur because some 
of the workers in the categories below may provide face-to-face service.  Undercounting occurs 
because this tabulation does not include other sales agents besides telemarketers, and many 
call centers define their work as primarily sales.  If one subgroup of sales agents is included 
(“sales representatives, services, other” (NAICS 41-3099), then the estimated number of call 
center workers rises to 4.33 million, or 3.11 percent of the workforce.  By these calculations, a 
reasonable estimate of the U.S. call center workforce in 2004 is between 2.5 and 3 percent of 
the U.S. workforce. 
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2 Data on numbers of call centers and employment come largely from interested parties, such as 
NASSCOM in India, and industry consultants such as Datamonitor in the U.S.  NASSCOM put the 
number of call center positions in India at 158,000 in 2004.  For the U.S. in 2001, Datamonitor estimated 
a total call center workforce of 2.5 million, with 88.7 percent located in in-house centers and 11.3 percent 
in outsourced centers.  It projected that by 2005, call center employment would grow by 14%, reaching a 
total of 2.86 million, with 13.4 percent located in outsourced centers (Datamonitor, 2001). Datamonitor 
bases its estimates on market research and the sale of call center work stations and other technology.  
Numbers of work stations may underestimate employment because they may be used for 2 or 3 shifts of 
workers.  More recently, Datamonitor estimated that the U.S. call center employment would fall to 2.7 
million positions in 47,500 call centers by 2008 (Datamonitor, 2004).  Our calculations, based on BLS 
data, suggest a U.S. call center workforce in 2004 of 3.97 million, or a range of between 2.5 and 3 
percent of the workforce. These calculations are limited by the available data. See appendix 1 for a 
technical note on these calculations. 
3 The adjustment based on the second term in the McDonald and Moffit (1980) decomposition is 
calculated by multiplying the tobit coefficients by [1-z*f(z)/F(z)-f(z)2/F(z)2], where F(z) is the cumulative 
normal distribution function associated with the probability of cases being above the left limit, f(z), the first 
derivative of F(z), is the unit normal density associated with this probability, and z is the corresponding z-
score for this probability (see Roncek 1992). 
 
